S ignificant changes have occurred in nursing since formal training began in 1893. A number of factors such as higher educational standards, shortage of general practitioners, and changing health care needs of society have all contributed to the expansion of nursing practice, Nurses in expanded roles are now performing functions such as diagnosis and treatment, functions traditionally reserved exclusively for the physician. Occupational health nurses who typically practice in an expanded role need to be cognizant of the legal significance of expanded practice, As discussed in the last column, the Missouri Supreme Court in a landmark case (Sermchief v. Gonzales, 660 S.W.2d 683 ,689 (1983) ) held the practice of nurses diagnosing and prescribing by protocol to be within the permissible scope of nursing practice in Missouri. The issue was not competency, but whether the practices were authorized bv Missouri's nurse practice act. Although the Missouri court's recognition of expanded practice is certainly a victory, legal authority for nursing practice comes from each state's nurse practice act. This case represents the need for nurses to include the expanded functions they perform in their own nurse practice act.
A nurse in an expanded role. must determine if the statutory language of the nurse practice act authorizes such functions as diagnosis and treatment. This is not always an easy task. Fra-mers of nurse practice acts are presently struggling with the current role expansion and the effects this expansion has had on nurse practice acts. This column examines statutory issues related to expanded practice and specifically addresses the use of protocols in diagnosing and treating clients.
PROTOCOLS
Most occupational health nurses utilize protocols or standing orders that have been developed and authorized in collaboration with a physician. Although protocols or standing orders are commonly used in health care settings, the legality of nurses performing certain functions by reference to a protocol has been challenged. The Attorney General of Georgia recently issued an opinion stating that no statutory authority existed for public health nurses to prescribe medications such as birth control pills by reference to a protocol; therefore, the activity was unlawful. (1988 Op. Att'y Gen. 9).
This decision shocked the providers of care for public health clients since public health nurses had been prescribing medications by protocol since 1973. Although the Attorney General of Georgia recognized that the practice of prescribing by protocol was a common nursing practice in public health clinics in Georgia (McCarthy, 1988) , the Attorney General interpreted Georgia's nurse practice act (O.C.G.A. ]] 43-26-1(3)) to authorize only the administration of medications ordered by physicians. (1988 Op. Att'y Gen. 9).
Because many medical and nursing functions overlap, nurses need clear statutory authority regarding the use of protocols and the functions that may be delegated by protocols to prevent nurses from being confronted with charges such as practicing medicine without a license. Occupational health nurses working under protocol should be aware of the permissible scope of nursing practice in their state and determine that the functions delegated to them by protocol fall within that permissible scope. All protocols should be signed by a physician, clearly define tasks authorized, and identify the educational preparation a . nurse must have to perform the tasks (Northrop, 1987) . The company policy should distinctly authorize nurses to practice by protocol.
LEGAL AUTHORITY TO
DIAGNOSE An inherent issue in the use of protocols is whether nurses have legal authority to diagnose. When treating a client by reference to protocol, a nurse makes diagnostic judgments and needs statutory authority to sanction these actions. The challenge faced by framers of nursing practice legislation is how to authorize expanded practice roles without encroaching upon the practice of medicine. One such dilemma Some nurse practice acts have attempted to differentiate between a nursing diagnosis and a medical diagnosis, which resulted in confusing the issue rather than clarifying it (Bullough, 1984) . In New York the nurse practice act defines diagnosing as "identification of and discrimination between physical and psychological signs and symptoms essential to effective execution and management of the nursing regimen." Then the definition is concluded by stating "[s]uch diagnostic privilege is distinct from a medical diagnosis" (N. Y. [Educ.] Law ]]6901-1). This definition represents the difficulty in statutorily distinguishing between a nursing and a medical diagnosis.
Cases upholding a nurse's authority to diagnose have not attempted to differentiate between a nursing and medical diagnosis. In Fein v. Permanente Medical Group (38 Cal.3d 137, 150, 695 P.2d 665, 674 (1985» the Supreme Court of California recognized that nurses could legally diagnose even though diagnosis was not included as a nursing function in California's nurse practice act.
The case involved a nurse practitioner who diagnosed a patient as having a muscle spasm. Continuing to have pain, the patient was seen by a physician who also diagnosed muscle spasms. Subsequently the patient was diagnosed as having a heart attack. After examining California's nurse practice act which explicitly recognized that physicians and nurses now share "overlapping functions," the court concluded that the diagnosis of a patient could not legally "be a function reserved to physicians, rather than registered nurses or nurse practitioners." (Fein, 38 Cal.3d at 150, 695 P.2d at 674).
In Sermchiefv. Gonzales (660 S. W. 2d 683,690 (1983» the court sanctioned nursing diagnoses and concluded that nurses were undertaking "only a nursing diagnosis, as opposed to a medical diagnosis," but the court did not define the difference. As with other expanded practice issues, the practice of diagnosing by protocol could be interpreted as the unauthorized practice of medicine if a state nurse practice act does not authorize the nurse to diagnose. Occupational health nurses make assessments daily that result in a diagnosis; therefore, in a state that does not clearly state diagnosis or nursing diagnosis as a nursing function, occupational health nurses should lobby to update the nurse practice act.
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE
Nurses in expanded roles must confront the issue of what is the applicable standard of care for a nurse in an expanded role. In a malpractice claim a nurse must first owe a duty to a client and then breach that duty by practicing below the minimal standard of care. Because nurses working in expanded roles are performing functions that have been considered more traditionally medical in nature, courts could be prompted to conclude that a nurse in an expanded role should be held to a medical standard rather than a nursing standard.
In Fein v. Permanente Medical Group (38 Cal.3d 137, 150, 695 P.2d 665,674 (1985» the trial court instructed the jury that the applicable standard of care for a nurse practitioner making a diagnosis was a medical standard; however, the Supreme Court of California ruled the instructions to be erroneous and held that the proper standard was one of a "reasonably prudent nurse practitioner."
This ruling represents a victory for nurses but also symbolizes a higher standard of care that nurses should be willing to assume, but at a nursing standard of advanced practice, rather than a physician standard. Nurses in occupational health settings must be willing to serve as expert witnesses to assure the court's understanding of the applicable standard of care for occupational health nurses.
In conclusion, occupational health nurses must be knowledgeable regarding the scope of practice as defined by the state nurse practice act. A nurse should assume new responsibility only after assuring that each function has statutory authority. If practices are commonly done but not statutorily authorized, nurses need to influence the legislative process to update their nurse practice act so that current practice is reflected.
